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From the mid-seventeenth century in England there was much discussion, most of it critical, of the 
phenomenon of enthusiasm.i It is hardly surprising, therefore, that John Locke included a chapter on 
enthusiasm in the fourth edition of his An Essay concerning Human Understanding, which appeared 
in 1700.ii Enthusiasm was defined in various ways but for Locke the central idea is that it is a claim to 
immediate inspiration –– that is, a special revelation from God –– of a proposition or immediate 
impulsion to an action, that is not authenticated by reason. For Locke, this was a cover for dogmatism 
and intellectual coercion. The question as to Locke’s motives for adding a chapter on enthusiasm to 
the fourth edition of the Essay, however, remains unanswered.  
 In 1993 Thomas Lennon argued that the polemical motivation of the chapter was to attack the 
philosophical enthusiasm of the Cartesians, especially Malebranche and his English disciple John 
Norris.iii A decade later, Nicholas Jolley took issue with Lennon and claimed that the chapter reveals 
Locke attacking a form of religious rather than philosophical enthusiasm. Furthermore, Jolley argued 
that the addition of this chapter enabled Locke to add greater balance to his religious polemics in the 
Essay. According to Jolley, the addition of the chapter opened up a second line of attack: where the 
first edition had an explicit attack on the religious right, namely Catholicism, the new chapter on 
enthusiasm enabled him to open an attack against the religious left, the Puritans. Locke’s target, 
therefore, is not Malebranche, but rather some unspecified proponents of enthusiasm amongst the 
Puritans or dissenters.iv Sadly, neither Lennon nor Jolley were able to settle the issue, such that in 
2010 Victor Nuovo could still claim “it is not clear why Locke decided to add a chapter on 
enthusiasm to the fourth edition of the Essay.”v I believe that we can move this issue forward. This 
paper is an attempt to advance our understanding of Locke’s motives for the inclusion of the chapter 
entitled “Of Enthusiasm,” in the fourth edition of the Essay.  
 The structure of the paper is as follows. In the Part One I present both textual and contextual 
evidence leading up to the publication of the fourth edition of the Essay in 1700 that renders it highly 
likely that Locke had the Quakers in mind when he penned “Of Enthusiasm.”vi The opening section of 
Part One presents striking textual evidence from Draft A of Locke’s Essay dating to 1671, that the 
Quakers were one of Locke’s polemical targets as early as the first edition of the Essay which was 
published in 1690. Following this, the analysis of background evidence is broken up into four stages 
that proceed in chronological order. In section two, I examine Locke’s early relations with the 
Quakers and his comments on enthusiasm in the period up to the composition of Draft A of the Essay 
in 1671. In section three, I turn to the evidence of Locke’s interactions with Quakers and comments 
on enthusiasm up until the publication of the French Abrégé of the Essay in 1688.vii Then, in the final 
sections of Part One, sections four and five, I scrutinize Locke’s engagement with the Quakers and 
thoughts on enthusiasm up to 1695, and 1700 respectively.  
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 The background evidence presented in Part One is highly suggestive that the Quakers are Locke’s 
target in “Of Enthusiasm,” yet this can only be confirmed through an examination of the Essay itself. 
This is the task of Part Two in which I show how “Of Enthusiasm” is integrated with its adjoining 
chapters in Book Four of the Essay, and the extent to which the vocabulary and terms of reference of 
Locke’s critique of enthusiasm in the Essay are continuous with his earlier discussions of the Quaker 
doctrine of immediate inspiration. When combined with the background evidence of Part One, Part 
Two provides a very strong case that the Quaker doctrine of immediate inspiration as a form of 
enthusiasm is Locke’s polemical target in “Of Enthusiasm.” 
 
 
Part One: Background Evidence 
 
1.1 The Quakers in Draft A §42 
Draft A of the Essay dates from 1671. It contains striking evidence that Locke regarded the Quakers 
as enthusiasts and that they were his polemical target in the first edition of the Essay. Part of the 
reason that scholars have missed this evidence is that they have been looking in the wrong place. The 
natural starting point for any inquiry into Locke’s polemical agenda in his critique of enthusiasm is 
the chapter added to the fourth edition of the Essay entitled “Of Enthusiasm” (Essay IV. xix). It turns 
out, however, that it is in the subsequent chapter on “Of wrong Assent, or Errour” (chapter xix in the 
first edition) that the key passage is located. Section ten of this chapter contains a passage that derives 
from Draft A §42 of the Essay. The two texts are placed in parallel below with their common contents 
underlined: 
 
Draft A §42 (1671) 
 
let a Quaker beleive his teacher to be inspird. & you in vaine bring probable reasons against his 
doctrines. Whoever therefor have imbibed wrong principles are not in things inconsistent with 
those principles to be moved with the most apparent & convinceing probablitys 
 
Essay1 IV. xix. 10 (1690) 
 
Let an Enthusiast be principled, that he or his Teacher is inspired, and acted by an immediate 
Communication of the Divine Spirit; and you in vain bring the Evidence of clear Reasons against 
his Doctrines. Whoever therefore have imbibed wrong Principles, are not, in Things inconsistent 
with these Principles, to be moved by the most apparent and convincing Probabilities. 
 
 There can be no question that the passage from the Essay derives from that of Draft A. And, of 
course, the salient point for our concerns is that Locke has replaced “a Quaker” with “an Enthusiast.” 
As it stands, however, there is no compelling reason to believe that Locke identified the Quakers as 
enthusiasts. Thus, for example, he may have changed the text because he had come to believe, after 
all, that it was enthusiasts rather than Quakers who fitted his description of those who have imbibed 
wrong principles about inspiration. It is apparent, therefore, that supporting evidence must be adduced 
in order to argue that the Quakers satisfy Locke’s description of the enthusiast in Essay IV. xx. 10. In 
the assembling of such evidence, the following questions ought to be addressed. First, why did Locke 
change “Quaker” to “Enthusiast”? Second, when did this change occur? Third, more specifically, is 
there evidence from the period between the early Drafts (c. 1671) and the Abrégé of the Essay (1688) 
that might indicate when and why this change was made? Fourthly, what can be gleaned from 
Locke’s relations with Quakers and Quakerism that might bear on these questions? In the following 
sections of Part One I will attempt to answer these questions by treating of Locke’s discussions of 
enthusiasm, Quakerism, and his interactions with Quakers in four chronological periods. 
 
1.2 Locke, the Quakers and enthusiasm up to 1671 
The Quakers had been associated with a critique of the phenomenon of enthusiasm at least since 
Henry More’s Enthusiasmus Triumphatus of 1656,viii however, while Locke later acquired a copy of 
More’s book,ix there is no evidence that More’s treatment of the subject was of any interest to the 
 young Locke at Oxford in the late 1650s.x Nevertheless, Locke’s first reference to the Quakers is 
highly critical. In a letter to an unknown correspondent from c. 1654, that is, early in his time at 
Oxford, Locke wrote of “lys and deceivers whereof we have an other experiment in the quakers here 
amongst us.”xi Two or three years later, on 15 November 1656, while in London he attended the first 
day of the trial of the Quaker leader and agitator James Naylor. Writing to his father of this 
experience he is again critical of the Quakers and signs off, “I am weary of the Quakers.”xii Then in 
June 1659 he mentioned the Quakers once more in a letter to his father. They had recently attacked 
the universities in print and Locke speaks of them parenthetically as they “who cannot in their carrage 
and raptures be thought any other then madd or jugglers.”xiii Two months later he described them in 
another letter as having “light in their breast and smoake in their mouth and mak up the company a 
degree of clowns.”xiv Then in the October of 1659 reflecting in yet another letter, this one on the 
effects of the imagination on reason, he says tellingly: 
 
I can not blame you [Tom] for yeelding to that which is the great commander of the world and 
tis Phansye that rules us all under the title of reason, this is the great guide both of the wise 
and the fooleish, only the former have the good lucke to light upon opinions that are most 
plausible or most advantageous. Where is that Great Diana of the world Reason, every one 
thinkes he alone imbraces this Juno, whilst others graspe noething but clouds, we are all 
Quakers here and there is not a man but thinks he alone hath this light within and all besids 
stumble in the darke.xv 
 
Here the Quakers are aligned with the foolish over and against the wise and Locke alludes to their 
doctrine of inner light and their view that those lacking this illumination “stumble in the darke.”  
 The pejorative comments continued. Writing to Alexander Popham in c. April 1660 Locke begs 
that Popham not think that he [Locke] “alone grew blinde and stupid or at least that all the light I have 
gaind from philosophie hath beene noe other then that of the Quakers which leads men from the sense 
of curtesy and gratitude.”xvi Locke’s reference to “the sense of curtesy” here is, no doubt, an allusion, 
inter alia, to the Quaker’s practice of not removing their hats when standing before social superiors. 
He mentions this specifically in his manuscript now entitled “First Tract on Government” where he 
says, “I know not how a Quaker should be compelled by hat or leg to pay a due respect to the 
magistrate.”xvii This comment is the first of many in which Locke uses Quakers as an example to 
make a point about the powers of the civil magistrate.xviii A second example is from late 1667 in both 
the first draft of his An Essay Concerning Toleration and the final version, where he used the Quakers 
as an example of a group of men who, if they were more numerous, would be “dangerous to the 
state.”xix  
 
 The overwhelming impression of this body of evidence is that Locke was not at all well disposed 
to the Quakers or Quakerism by the time he began his long-term project of providing an account of 
human understanding in 1671. What then can be said of his views on and attitude towards enthusiasm 
during this period? The answer is, surprisingly very little. There is at least one text, however, that 
mentions the subject. It is a short essay in Latin from 1661 on the subject of infallibility and it 
provides a very early precedent for the juxtaposition of a critique of claims for the infallibility of the 
Pope with a warning against enthusiasm that we will find in later texts.xx In the final paragraph of this 
essay Locke concludes that in the interpretation of Scripture, “it is not very easy or straightforward to 
decide how much is to be allowed to each individual and how much to the authority of the church, 
what finally reason warrants and what the illumination of the holy spirit.” On the fourth factor, the 
illumination of the Spirit, “enthusiasm must be carefully avoided, lest while waiting for the inspiration 
of the holy spirit, we admire and worship our dreams.”xxi Interestingly this juxtaposition of papal 
infallibility with the Quakers, rather than enthusiasm, occurs in our key passage from Draft A cited 
above. For there, Locke follows his comments on the indoctrinated Roman Catholic who “must 
believe as the church beleives or that the Pope is infallible” with comments on the similarly benighted 
Quaker: “let a Quaker beleive his teacher to be inspird. & you in vaine bring probable reasons against 
his doctrines.”xxii 
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1.2 Locke, the Quakers and enthusiasm, 1671–1688 
 
Apart from the reference in Draft A and some notes on philanthropy and toleration,xxiii there is a 
dearth of references to the Quakers in Locke’s writings from the 1670s. In the early 1680s, however, 
we find occasional references to the Quakers and Locke’s first sustained reflections on the nature of 
enthusiasm. In his “Critical notes on Stillingfleet” of 1681, Locke somewhat cynically responds to the 
claim that “there are a certain set of men in the world [the Anglican clergy] upon whose credit I must 
without farther examination to venture my salvation.”xxiv After mentioning “the infallible Church of 
Rome [who] boldly claime a right to coine opinions into truths” and the Pope who “demands an 
obedient faith to him & his emissarys,” Locke mentions “the Quakers [who] think them selves the 
only true guides whilst they bid us be guided by the light within.”xxv Each church claims itself to be 
“the true Church” as do “Cardinall H. and Mr. P for the papist and Quakers.”xxvi The reference here is 
almost certainly to William Penn who will reappear shortly. Meanwhile, our concern here is to flag 
Locke’s reference to the Quaker doctrine of inner light, a belief whose epistemic implications Locke 
will later tease out in some detail. 
 It appears that it was not until his exile in the Netherlands in the mid-1680s that Locke actually 
befriended a Quaker, namely, Benjamin Furly, and on 8 October 1686 he recorded in his journal a 
brief sketch of the origins of the movement derived from his new friend: 
 
Concerning the begining of the Quakers all I can learne from B. F.xxvii  is that John Saltmarsh 
who had been Fairfax Chaplain & a minister of the Church of England was the first that began 
to be scrupulous of the hat & useing common language in the year 1649 In the yeare 50 
George Fox a shoemaker & James Naylor a Serjeant of the army in the North began to publish 
the doctrine of the light etc.xxviii   
 
 The next reference to the Quakers in Locke’s writings is found in a set of comments on Robert 
Barclay’s Possibility and Necessity of the Inward Immediate Revelation of the Spirit of God (1686) 
entitled “Immediate Inspiration.” Locke composed these comments while in exile in the Netherlands 
in December 1687. As it happens, he was staying at the time in the house of his Quaker friend 
Benjamin Furly, and it is almost certain that Furly, a friend of Robert Barclay, was closely involved in 
the publication of Barclay’s tract. For, Furly wrote a postscript to Barclay’s letter explaining the 
provenance of the tract. He writes, “This Letter a Year ago at the desire of my Freind R. B. I delivered 
into the hands of the aforenamed Ambassador, desiring his answer in writting, which he then 
promised; but not having as yet done, It was seen meet to be published. B. F. Rotterdam the 28 of 
March; 1678.”xxix Locke’s assessment of Barclay’s account of the immediate inspiration of the Holy 
Spirit is critical in orientation and he addresses Barclay in the second person: 
 
But granting that it is an immediate influence of the Spirit joyning with or makeing use of 
preaching to produce divine faith what will this advantage your cause or what ground of 
pretence can your church have to it before any other, for this internal perception being a thing 
impossible to be made knowne to any but he that has & feels it, if you have had & felt such an 
influence upon your owne minde tis impossible you should know whether any other Quaker (I 
usexxx not that name with any disrespect but as I do al others as that by which things are 
distinguished in discourse) ever had any such.xxxi 
 
Here is Locke in late 1687 in the home of a Quaker, reading a Quaker apologist on what can only be 
described as enthusiasm and addressing the latter in the second person. In fact, this is the first text in 
which Locke brings Quakerism and enthusiasm together. For, when discussing the strong “impulse to 
assent” that the Quakers claim to experience, Locke proceeds to claim that we need to distinguish the 
causes of such strong impulses “else the most extravagant boundlesse enthusiasme must passe for 
revelation.”xxxii  
 Nevertheless, Locke’s parenthetical remark aimed at avoiding the charge of disrespect –– “I use 
not that name [Quaker] with any disrespect” –– reflects a tempering of Locke’s attitude towards the 
Quakers. In fact, Locke claimed at one point that Furly was beginning to win him over.xxxiii This, in 
turn, may be the reason that he changed the word “Quaker” in the chapter on “Of Wrong assent, or 
 Errour” in Book Four of the Essay and replaced it with “Enthusiast.” For it was in the home of Furly 
that Locke finished writing the Essay and prepared it for publication,xxxiv though precisely when this 
change was made remains unknown.  
 Part of the process of preparation of the Essay involved the writing of a summary or abrégé that 
was printed in February 1688 in French and which appeared in volume eight of the Bibliothèque 
universelle et historique and was translated by Jean Le Clerc.xxxv An earlier version of the Abrégé in 
English, the “Epitome,” which probably dates from before 1685,xxxvi provides one interesting point of 
comparison. Both the “Epitome” and Abrégé lack any references to enthusiasm or to Quakers. 
However, in “Epitome” Book Four, chapter nineteen Locke speaks of “Original revelation” claiming 
that one cannot assent to it contrary to the principles of “our natural knowledge,”xxxvii whereas the 
parallel passage in the Abrégé speaks of “une Révélation originale & immédiate.”xxxviii It may well be 
that the insertion of “immédiate” here reflects the impact of Locke’s reading of Barclay. Whatever the 
case, in the published Essay Locke completely restructures the order of the material in Abrégé Book 
Four chapters seventeen to nineteen, and deploys its distinction between traditional and original 
revelation in the chapter on “Faith and Reason” (Essay IV. xviii. 3). He defines original revelation as 
“that first Impression, which is made immediately by GOD, on the Mind of any Man.”xxxix This notion 
of immediate revelation, which had been the central doctrine under scrutiny in the notes on 
“Immediate Inspiration,” was to become the focal point of the later chapter “Of Enthusiasm” added to 
fourth edition. In that chapter Locke says: 
 
Immediate Revelation being a much easier way for Men to establish their Opinions, and 
regulate their Conduct, than the tedious and not always successful Labour of strict Reasoning, 
it is no wonder, that some have been very apt to pretend to Revelation, and to perswade 
themselves, that they are under the peculiar guidance of Heaven in their Actions and Opinions, 
especially in those of them, which they cannot account for by the ordinary Methods of 
Knowledge, and Principles of Reason.xl 
 
 In fact, Locke’s concern with immediate revelation and its relation to enthusiasm predates his 
comments on Barclay’s book by some years. In a series of notes on inspiration, revelation and 
enthusiasm in his journal from February 1682, Locke sets out for the first time a clear definition of 
enthusiasm, discusses it as a phenomenon that pertains to religion only –– even citing travel 
literaturexli  –– and mentions a few features of its psychopathology. He had already discussed 
inspiration in his journal in April 1681 xlii  raising what would become his main criticism of 
enthusiasm, namely, the problem of providing a principled reason for believing that a proposition is 
inspired by God rather than from some other source: “where reason is not judg it is impossible for a 
man himself to destinguish betwixt inspiration and phansy; truth, and error.”xliii 
 
 The journal entry for 19 February 1682 is focused on enthusiasm explicitly. It opens with a 
definition: 
 
A strong and firme perswasion of any proposition relateing to religion for which a man hath 
either noe or not sufficient proofs from reason but receives them as truths wrought in the 
minde extraordinarily by god him self and influences comeing immediately from him seemes 
to me to be Enthusiasme, which can be noe evidence or ground of assureance at all nor can by 
any means be taken for Knowledg.xliv 
 
One important feature of this definition is that Locke restricts the phenomenon to propositions whose 
content pertains to religion. Interestingly, Locke then mentions a range of religions where enthusiasm 
is found: “For I finde that Christians, Mahumetans, and Bramins all pretend to it (and I am told the 
Chineses too).”xlv Later in the entry he claims, “I doe not remember that I have read of any Enthysiast 
amongst the Americans or any who have not pretended to a revealed religion.”xlvi Moreover, in this 
entry Locke also emphasizes the extent to which enthusiasm involves the imagination, for the rational 
power of the mind is “disturbed” and “depressed” by such practices as “Fasting, solitude, intense and 
long meditation on the same thing, opium intoxicateing liquors, long and vehement turning round, 
&c[…].” The same themes appear in a note two days later on 21 February 1682: 
 
 6 
what ever opinions or perswasions are in the minde without any foundation of reason, may 
indeed by the temper and disposition of some mindes whether naturall or acquired seeme as 
cleare and operate as strongly as true knoweledg, but indeed are not knoweldg but if they 
concerne god and religion deserve the name of Enthusiasme ... 
whatever strong perswasions we have in matters divine not riseing from nor vouchd by reason 
I cannot looke on otherwise then perfect Enthusiasme .xlvii 
 
This entry contains Locke’s reflections on John Smith’s Select Discourses and is part of an exchange 
that he was engaged in with Damaris Masham. In particular, Locke discusses Smith’s fourth (of four) 
type of people whose self-conception of their epistemic state, in Locke’s view, seems “very much to 
savour of Enthusiasme and soe will be very litle different from my Visionarys I meane in respect of 
their opinions and knowledg.”xlviii  
 Much more could be said concerning these entries, such as his later identification of visionaries 
with enthusiasts,xlix yet the conclusion for us to draw at this stage is that it is clear that for Locke in the 
early 1680s enthusiasm is a generic phenomenon found amongst religious people who have a claim to 
divine inspiration. It is not restricted to one Christian sect, such as the Quakers, or even the Christian 
religion, though Locke believes that it is a strictly religious phenomenon. 
 
1.3 Locke, the Quakers and enthusiasm, 1688–1695 
 
From 1688 Locke’s interactions with Quakers take on a less negative tone, though any positive 
impressions of Quakerism at this time were short-lived, for during the early 1690s he was confronted 
with others’ disillusionment with the movement. His friendship with Furly flourished and Locke 
resided with him in Rotterdam from February 1687 until his return to England in February 1689. 
While there he met and befriended another Quaker, the mercurial F. M. van Helmont, who arrived in 
Rotterdam from the home of Anne Conway where he had served as her physician and with whom, 
much to the alarm of Henry More, he had converted to Quakerism in 1677.l Interestingly, Conway 
herself was alert to the danger of claims to immediate inspiration. In her letter to Henry More of 4 
February 1675/6 she says,  
  
I pray God give us all a clear discerning betweene Melancholy Enthusiasme and true 
Inspiration that we may not be imposed upon to believe a lye. The great difference of opinion 
in this point amongst the learned and experienced occasions much perplexity in minds less 
exercised, and so not well fitted for judging.li  
 
 Moreover, while residing at Ragley van Helmont and Lady Conway interacted closely with the 
Quaker George Keith and, through Keith, with Robert Barclay. On 12 March 1676, for instance, Keith 
wrote to Barclay who was returning from London, “In thy return homewards I have a great desire if 
thou be free to it that thou again visit her called the Lady Conway, and I could wish thou hadst more 
time with her than formerly, which might be usefull to her, and also to Van Helmont.”lii Another 
Quaker in the circle around Henry More in the mid-1670s that included Lady Conway, van Helmont 
and Keith, was William Penn (whose poorly) understood relations with Locke during his exile in the 
Netherlands may have originated through their mutual Quaker connections.liii Among the eleven 
books by Penn in Locke’s library was A Key for the Understanding the Religion of the Quakers 
(London, 1694).liv It seems likely, therefore, that in addition to discussing chymistry with van 
Helmontlv Locke discussed Quakerism. This, in turn, might have provided an entrée a few years later 
for Locke to meet up with George Keith, who from 1691 was in a bitter dispute with the Quakers, first 
in Philadelphia, where he was charged with “denying the Sufficiency of the Light,”lvi and then in 
England.  
 Locke returned to London from the Netherlands on 12/22 February 1689. By late 1692 Furly was 
writing to Locke of his own disenchantment with Quakerism. His letter to Locke of 7/17 November 
that year shows that he was clearly fed up with them. He expressed his desire that Locke give his 
situation his “serious consideration,’ that he speak to Damaris Masham about it, and give him his 
thoughts. Should he, Furly, “take that last step” and leave the Quakers “to deliver my self from the 
odious name, of a Sectarian, narrow spirited creature, which I never was.”lvii Then, eighteen months 
later, on 26 May 1694, Furly wrote to Locke, “I see your resolution to see G: Keith in London, and 
 shall be glad to understand the Issue of your conference.”lviii Furly was not the only one interested, for 
Martha Lockhart wrote to Locke in July 1694 claiming that her cousin “desire’s to kno’ for what 
reason You were so partial to George Keith. severall other questions, we would ask both of that 
affair.”lix No doubt the “Keithian controversy,” as it has come to be known, had piqued many people’s 
interest. In the event, Locke, fully apprized of the reasons for Furly’s disillusionment and Keith’s 
vexing trials,lx did meet Keith and was interested enough in his thought and conflicts with the Quakers 
to acquire about a dozen of his books for his library, including the second edition of Keith’s 
Immediate Revelation not Ceased (London, 1675).lxi Later that year Keith was expelled at the annual 
Quaker assembly and he soon became a vehement opponent of the movement and, ironically, came to 
associate their “quaking” with enthusiasm.lxii Van Helmont also ended up disowning Quakerism, 
though it is not known when precisely this took place.lxiii 
 Keith’s Immediate Revelation not Ceased bears close parallels with Barclay’s Possibility and 
Necessity of the Inward Immediate Revelation of the Spirit of God that Locke was reading at Furly’s 
in 1687. In fact, six months after taking notes on this volume of Barclay Locke received a package of 
writings by Barclay from his friend the Amsterdam bookseller Hendrik Wetstein. It is not clear 
exactly what they were, but Locke’s library contained five of Barclay’s works, including three works 
published in Rotterdam and one (in Dutch) published in Amsterdam.lxiv Furthermore, as we see from 
his library catalogue,lxv Furly was a bibliophile and there can be little doubt that his knowledge of and 
holdings in Quaker literature had an impact on Locke’s acquisition and understanding of works by 
Quakers and on Quakerism.lxvi A case in point is Furly’s lengthy discussion in a letter to Locke of the 
French history of Quakerism, Histoire abregée de la naissance et du progrez du Kouakerisme of 
1692,lxvii a copy of which he posted to Locke, who took receipt of it on 22 April 1692.lxviii In his letter 
to Locke of 12 March, Furly pointed out that in this work not only n “the Q[uakers] are horribly 
treated but the English nation in General as fantastick melancholy fooles, and Enthusiasts.”lxix It 
cannot be doubted then, that Locke kept up a keen interest in Quakerism throughout the early 
1690s.lxx  
 He also continued to reflect on enthusiasm during these years. In a short set of theological 
reflections on William Lowth’s A Vindication of the Divine Authority and Inspiration of the Writings 
of the Old and New Testament, entitled “Scriptura Sacra” from 1692, Locke poses a series of 
questions. At one point he claims, picking up Lowth’s terminology, “particular revelation not 
pretended to but by Enthusiasts,” where “particular revelation” is immediate revelation, and he poses 
an additional query, “Whether the name Enthusiasts answers their arguments for particular 
revelation?”lxxi It must be confessed that there is not much in these condensed comments. However, 
the salient point here is the continuity of interest in the notion of inspiration and its relation to 
enthusiasm. 
 That enthusiasm was weighing on Locke’s mind in the mid-1690s is confirmed by his exchange 
with William Molyneux in 1695. Locke wrote to Molyneux on 8 March of that year asking for advice 
as to how to augment the Essay. Molyneux’s previous suggestion had already led to the inclusion of a 
new chapter “Of Identity and Diversity” which contains Locke’s famous theory of personal identity. 
Locke now put a suggestion to his Irish friend, “I have had some thoughts my self, that it would not 
be possibly amiss to add, in lib. iv. ch. 18, something about Enthusiasm, or to make a chapter of it by 
it self.”lxxii Molyneux soon replied: 
 
I must freely Confes that if my Notion of Enthusiasme agrees with yours, there is no necessity 
of adding any thing concerning it more than by the by and in a single section in Chap. XVIII. 
L.IV. I conceive it to be no other than a Religious sort of Madnes and Comprises not in it any 
Mode of Thinking or Operation of the Mind, Different from what you have treated off in your 
Essay. Tis true indeed, the Absurditys Men imbrace on account of Religion are most 
Astonishing, and if in a Chapter of Enthusiasme you indeavour to give an Account of them, 
’twould be very acceptable. so that (on second thoughts) I do very well approve of what you 
propose therein, being very desirous of having your sentiments on any subject.lxxiii 
 
Locke rounds off this matter in their correspondence on 26 April showing that he had made up his 
mind to make the addition: 
 
 8 
What I shall add concerning Enthusiasm, I guess, will very much agree with your thoughts, 
since yours jump so right with mine, about the place where it is to come in, I having designed 
it for chap. 18. lib. iv. as a false principle of reasoning often made use of. But, to give an 
historical account of the various ravings men have embraced for religion, would, I fear, be 
besides my purpose, and be enough to make an huge volume.lxxiv 
 
 It is clear then that in the period from the publication of the Abrégé to April 1695 both the Quakers 
and enthusiasm continued to feature in his social relations and intellectual preoccupations. He entered 
the second half of the 1690s with a new resolve to write at least a section on enthusiasm for his next 
edition of the Essay, but what of his relations with the Quakers during the years leading up to the 
publication of the fourth edition of the Essay with its new chapter on enthusiasm? 
 
1.5 Locke, the Quakers and enthusiasm, 1695–1700 
 
In the year following his meeting with George Keith Locke was as good as his word to Molyneux and 
began to write a new chapter for the Essay. It was to be entitled “Of Enthusiasm.” In the same year he 
recorded a treatment for cancer and king’s evil in one of his medical notebooks.lxxv This medical 
receipt derived from the leading Quaker woman and writer Anne Docwra. Other receipts from 
Docwra, dating from 1695 to 1699, at least one of which is extracted from a letter from Docwra to 
Damaris Masham, are to be found in one of Locke’s commonplace books that had been put to more 
domestic uses in the Masham household at this time.lxxvi There is, to my knowledge, no extant 
evidence that Locke ever met Anne Docwra, however, the latter’s correspondence with Damaris 
Masham suggests that Docwra and Damaris were more than casually acquainted. In fact, Docwra also 
knew two of Damaris’ brothers. Thus, it seems fair to conclude that Locke at least knew of the Quaker 
Docwra through Damaris and may even have made her acquaintance. 
 It is therefore of singular interest that in 1700, the year in which Locke’s chapter “Of Enthusiasm” 
appeared in the fourth edition of the Essay, Docwra published her own short A Treatise concerning 
Enthusiasm, or Inspiration, of the Holy Spirit of God in which she defends enthusiasm on both 
biblical and Malebranchean grounds.lxxvii Could Docwra also have been part of the conversation? And 
if so, might Docwra’s participation in this conversation, however muted, have foregrounded the link 
for Locke between Quakerism and enthusiasm? It is well known that Damaris Cudworth discusses the 
danger of enthusiasm in her A Discourse Concerning the Love of God (1696) which is a critique of the 
views of the English Malebranchean John Norris.lxxviii Interestingly, Docwra’s treatise appeals to 
Malebranchean doctrines in defence of enthusiasm. We also know that it was during the years from 
1695 to 1697 that Locke drafted the substance of what was to become “Of Enthusiasm” in the fourth 
edition of the Essay.lxxix Sadly though, there is, as yet, no evidence of any philosophical exchange 
between Docwra on the one hand and Locke and Damaris Masham on the other. Nevertheless, all of 
these interactions with Quakers and reflections on their doctrine of immediate revelation and its 
relation to enthusiasm strongly suggest that it was the Quakers, above all others, who were in the 
foreground as Locke came to consider and to critique the nature of religious enthusiasm and to pen his 
most celebrated chapter on the subject. It is to the content of that chapter that we now turn.  
 
Part Two: The Quakers, immediate inspiration and “Of Enthusiasm” 
 
The chapter on enthusiasm is sandwiched between the chapters on faith and reason, and wrong assent 
and error. It opens with a section on the importance of the search after truth (Essay IV. xix. 1) and 
then introduces a third ground of assent over and above the two grounds dealt with in the previous 
chapter, namely, faith and reason. This supposed third ground is enthusiasm. Locke claims that, in 
fact, this third ground negates the first two “and substitutes in the room of it, the ungrounded Fancies 
of a Man’s own Brain, and assumes them for a Foundation both of Opinion and Conduct” (§3). Two 
points are worth noting here. First, from the outset the treatment of enthusiasm is carefully grafted on 
to the theory of reason and faith: it is not a mere add-on or digression from the flow of the 
development of Locke’s theory of the understanding. Second, we should note that enthusiasm is 
manifested in both opinions and actions or conduct. The term “action” occurs ten times and “conduct” 
three times in the chapter, where it is normally paired with “opinion” or “persuasion.” Thus, for 
 example, Locke speaks of “the odd Opinions and extravagant Actions, Enthusiasm has run Men into” 
(§8). Interestingly, the only other place we find this dual expression of enthusiasm is in Locke’s notes 
on Barclay in “Immediate Inspiration” from 1686. There, Locke speaks of “the vehemence of the 
impulse where with he feels his minde caryd to the assent of such a proposition or performance of 
such an action beyond what reason moves him to.”lxxx This coupling of opinion and action is 
important: first, because it may well originate from Locke’s preoccupation with the strange actions 
that he saw Quakers performing –– he speaks of “extravagant actions” and “odd actions” in “Of 
Enthusiasm”;lxxxi and second, because it sets the phenomenon of enthusiasm apart from that other 
form of madness that he first discusses in the fourth edition of the Essay, namely, the association of 
ideas.lxxxii  
 As for the relation of “Of Enthusiasm” to the subsequent chapter on wrong assent and error, the 
key philosophical point appears to be the place of enthusiasm in Locke’s theory of principles. In 
section eight of “Of Enthusiasm” Locke is quite clear that the pernicious nature of this phenomenon 
lies in the adoption of a dangerous principle: “Though the odd Opinions and extravagant Actions, 
Enthusiasm has run Men into, were enough to warn them against this wrong Principle so apt to 
misguide them both in their Belief and Conduct.” This point had already been made in the chapter on 
wrong assent and error in the first edition of the Essay and the later addition of “Of Enthusiasm” 
should be regarded as an elaboration of it. Thus, in Essay IV. xx. 10 Locke is spelling out the first of 
four ways in which we fall into error by making wrong measures of probability. The first way that we 
mistake measures of probability is taking propositions for principles that “are not in themselves 
certain and evident.”lxxxiii Section ten is given over to providing examples of this error and the term 
“principle” occurs ten times in this section. The first example is the “intelligent Romanist” who “hath 
had this Principle constantly inculcated,” that he must believe what the Church believes or “that the 
Pope is Infallible” or the principle of transubstantiation. The second example is, as we have already 
seen, the enthusiast. Locke says “Let an Enthusiast be principled,” using the now obsolete verbal form 
of “principle” which here implies indoctrination or at least inculcation. How does the enthusiast come 
to be principled? By imbibing the opinion that “he or his Teacher is inspired, and acted by an 
immediate Communication of the Divine Spirit.” And, of course, this is the very passage that in Draft 
A originally described a Quaker.  
 In fact, Locke had already made the very same point in a shorthand entry in his journal on 25 
August 1676 and recycled it almost verbatim in the chapter on faith and reason in the Essay:  
 
For Men having been principled with an Opinion, that they must not consult Reason in the 
Things of Religion, however apparently contradictory to common Sense, and the 
very Principles of all their Knowledge, have let loose their Fancies, and natural Superstition; 
and have been, by them, led into so strange Opinions, and extravagant Practices in Religion, 
that a considerate Man cannot but stand amazed at their Follies.lxxxiv 
 
Here too, we find the verbal form of “principle” and the reference to “strange Opinions, and 
extravagant Practices in Religion” and so this passage is highly suggestive of another allusion to the 
Quakers. Thus, Jolley is correct when he claims “[t]he polemic against religious enthusiasm thus 
complements the critique of the doctrine of divinely inscribed ideas and principles which dominates 
Book I of the Essay.”lxxxv However, we should also add that the chapter on enthusiasm reinforces the 
preexisting critique of principles in Book IV of the earlier editions of the Essay. Clearly Locke is 
bringing the same philosophical argument against both the Romanist and the enthusiast: they both 
mistakenly take propositions that lack certainty for certain principles.  
 The kernel of Locke’s complaint against enthusiasm is the lack of a principled reason, over and 
above the strength of one’s inner persuasion, for believing claims to immediate revelation from 
God.lxxxvi In “Of Enthusiasm” he says that in the case of scriptural revelation the prophets “had 
outward Signs to convince them of the Author of those Revelations.” For example, “Moses saw the 
Bush burn without being consumed, and heard a Voice out of it.”lxxxvii Locke had made the same point 
a decade earlier in “Immediate Inspiration” in the context of discussing a Quaker:  
 
soe there was need also of some signe some way of distinction where by the messenger him 
self might be convinced that his message was from god. Thus god spoke to Moses not by a 
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bare influence on his minde, but out of a bush all on fire that consumed not.lxxxviii  
  
It is not that Locke rejected the possibility of immediate inspiration tout court. In winding up his 
critique of enthusiasm he affirms: “I am far from denying, that GOD can, or doth sometimes enlighten 
Mens Minds in the apprehending of certain Truths, or excite them to Good Actions by the immediate 
influence and assistance of the Holy Spirit, without any extraordinary Signs accompanying it.”lxxxix 
Not surprisingly, he had expressed the same openness to immediate inspiration in his comments on 
Barclay, for it is something “noe body can deny that considers an omnipotent agent & author of us.”xc 
 Furthermore, as we saw above, in one of his earliest comments on the Quakers, Locke associated 
their view of immediate revelation with the metaphor of an inner light. In his ironic comment to Tom 
in 1659 that “we are all Quakers here and there is not a man but thinks he alone hath this light 
within,” in his “Critical Notes on Stillingfleet” of 1681 where he says, “the Quakers think them selves 
the only true guides whilst they bid us be guided by the light within’ and in his record of Furly’s 
comment on the emergence of the Quakers and their ‘doctrine of the light,” Locke seems to have 
regarded this as distinctive of the Quakers.xci It is of singular interest, therefore, that Locke pays 
particular attention to ‘this internal Light’ in the chapter on enthusiasm in the Essay. The term “light” 
occurs thirty-three times in “Of Enthusiasm” accounting for more than half of its occurrences in the 
whole of Book Four. In fact, Locke’s usage here includes the terms that he had earlier associated with 
Quakers, namely “internal Light” and “Light within.”xcii  
 Moreover, in Locke’s comments on Barclay in his “Immediate Inspiration” Locke is concerned 
with the pairing of this inner light or “internal perception,” with feeling. He says of the internal 
perception it is “a thing impossible to be made knowne to any but he that has & feels it”; that to a man 
of reason the enthusiast “sees or perceives or feels by a new sort of sensation” what is really “a 
vehemence of the impulse where with he feels his minde caryd to the assent of such a proposition or 
performance of such an action.”xciii And it is this pairing of seeing and feeling that Locke takes up 
from section ten of “Of Enthusiasm” in order to set out his critique of the phenomenon. His polemical 
technique is to strip away “the Metaphor of seeing and feeling” by showing that the feeling is nothing 
more than a strong persuasion. 
 
But to examine a little soberly this internal Light, and this feeling on which they build so 
much. These Men have, they say, clear Light, and they see; They have an awaken’d Sense, 
and they feel: This cannot, they are sure, be disputed them. For when a Man says he sees or 
feels, no Body can deny it him, that he does so.xciv 
 
Given these strong parallels then between “Immediate Inspiration” and “Of Enthusiasm,” it is difficult 
to resist the conclusion that the latter deploys the very terms of reference that Locke used to frame his 
discussion of Barclay’s doctrine of immediate inspiration in 1686 in which he first brought together 
enthusiasm and the Quakers. Locke’s thoughts on the Quaker doctrine of immediate inspiration, with 
its focus on propositions and actions, inner light and feelings, the appeal to divine signs (citing Moses 
and the burning bush by way of example), together with the metaphor of the inner light, provided the 
basic framework for his later more considered treatment of the issue in “Of Enthusiasm.” 
  
 Yet there is one final twist to this tale. For, as Locke was preparing the fourth edition of the 
Essay for publication during 1699, Pierre Coste was simultaneously writing a French translation of 
the Essay. Most, though not all, of Locke’s changes to the third edition are incorporated in the Coste 
translation which Locke read and approved before it was published in 1700.xcv One change that was 
included in Coste’s translation was the new chapter on enthusiasm. It is of particular interest 
therefore, to note some changes that Coste introduced, with Locke’s acquiescence in the subsequent 
chapter on “Erreur.” I juxtapose the two passages here: 
 
 Essay IV. xx. 10 (1700) 
 
Take an intelligent Romanist, that ... hath had this Principle constantly inculcated 
Understanding ... 
 
 Let an Enthusiast be principled, that he or his Teacher is inspired, and acted by an 
immediate Communication of the Divine Spirit, and you in vain bring the Evidence of 
clear Reasons against his Doctrines.  
 
 
Essai philosophique IV. xx. 10 (1700) 
 
Prenez un Lutherien de bon sens à qui l’on aît constamment inculqué ce Principe, ... 
 
 
... Qu’un Fanatique prenne pour Principe que luy ou son Docteur est inspiré & 
conduit par une direction immediate du Saint Esprit; c’est en vain que vous attaquez 
ses Dogmes par les raisons les plus évidentes. 
 
Where Locke in Draft A and in the Essay had “intelligent Romanist,” he allows Coste’s Lutherien. 
And more pointedly, where Draft A had “Quaker” and the Essay had “Enthusiast,” he allows Coste’s 
“Fanatique.” Clearly Locke was sensitive to his readership and was prepared to modify his examples 
to suit his audience. Francophone readers in Catholic France would have been put off by Locke’s 
example of the misguided Romanist, but would have found the reference to the indoctrinated 
Lutheran to their fancy. It would also go down well with the Calvinist Dutch Huguenots. No doubt a 
similar claim can be made for Locke’s Anglophone readership: Why put off Quaker friends and 
acquaintances when one can make the same point using the more generic term “enthusiast”? All of 
this reinforces the fact that in Locke’s mind it was the Quakers who were enthusiasts par excellence. 
What this serves to bring out, however, is that it is really the philosophical content of the Essay that is 
Locke’s concern. The Romanist, Lutheran and enthusiast are merely examples that he is prepared to 
chop and change. Far from a religious polemical agenda being built in to the fabric of the Essay, 
Locke’s critical remarks on religious sects are designed to facilitate the communication of his 
philosophical analysis of the phenomenon.  
 What are we to conclude from all of this? The trail of circumstantial evidence that has been laid 
out in Part One, together with the continuities between his comments on Barclay and “Of 
Enthusiasm” we have adduced in the philosophical treatments of enthusiasm and Quakerism in Part 
Two, furnish us with a compelling case that when Locke substituted “Enthusiast” for “Quaker” while 
incorporating that passage from Draft A into the Essay, he regarded the two terms as interchangeable. 
For Locke “enthusiasm” is not synonymous with “Quakerism,” yet in his mind the Quakers were the 
archetypal enthusiasts in so far as they claimed to experience a form of immediate inspiration that was 
not subject to reason. 
 
 
Notes 
                                                
* This paper was first read at the Sydney Medieval and Renaissance Group in April 2017. I should like to thank 
the audience there as well as Claire Crignon, Michael Hunter, Sarah Hutton, Victor Nuovo and the two 
anonymous referees for the journal for comments. 
i For background on the critique of enthusiasm in the seventeenth century, see Heyd, “Be Sober and 
Reasonable.” 
ii Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding (hereafter Essay) IV. xix. All quotes are from the fourth 
edition unless indicated by a subscript, i.e. Essay1. 
iii Lennon, The Battle of the Gods and Giants, 172–183. 
iv Jolley, “Reason’s dim candle: Locke’s critique of enthusiasm,” 182–183. In his recent treatment of Locke on 
enthusiasm in Toleration and Understanding in Locke, which only came to my attention after the completion of 
this article, Jolley claims, “The chapter represents the culmination of Locke’s lifelong concern with the 
enthusiasts or Puritan fanatics, especially the Quakers” (91). However, he provides no evidence in support of the 
claim. 
v Nuovo, “Enthusiasm,” 142. 
vi Only a few scholars have recognized the association between enthusiasm and the Quakers in Locke’s mind. 
The earliest is perhaps Wolfgang von Leyden. See his Introduction to Locke, Essays on the Law of Nature, 79. 
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See also Biddle, “Locke’s critique of innate principles and Toland’s Deism,” 414 and Harris, The Mind of John 
Locke, 56.  
vii Locke, “Extrait d’un Livre Anglois qui n’est pas encore publié, intitulé Essai Philosophique concernant 
L’Entendement.” 
viii See Heyd, “Be Sober and Reasonable”, 92–108 and Wilson, “Entuhusiasm and its critics; historical and 
modern perspectives,” 464–470. For a general treatment of the Quakers and the charge of enthusiasm, see 
Cherry, “Enthusiasm and madness: anti-Quakerism in the seventeenth century.” 
ix Locke owned the 2nd edition of More’s 1662 Collection of Several Philosophical Writings, which contains a 
revised version of Enthusiasmus Triumphatus. See Harrison and Laslett, The Library of John Locke (hereafter 
LL), 2046. 
x See More, Enthusiasmus Triumphatus, 24–26, 29.  
xi Locke, Correspondence of John Locke (hereafter Corr.), vol. 1, 17. See also Locke’s letter to his father, 25 
October 1656, ibid., 41–42. 
xii Ibid., 44. 
xiii Ibid., 84. 
xiv Ibid., 98. 
xv Ibid., 123. 
xvi Ibid., 145. Locke believed himself to have encountered a group of Quakers in Cleves about whom he wrote to 
John Strachey on 14 December 1665; see ibid., 237. 
xvii Locke, Political Essays, 22. 
xviii  For other examples of Locke’s use of the Quakers in the context of discussions of civil authority, see “Of the 
difference between civil and ecclesiastical power” from 1674, in Locke, Political Essays, 220; “Toleration A” 
from 1675 in ibid., 232; “Toleration B” in ibid., 247; “Critical notes on Stillingfleet”, ibid., 375; A Letter 
Concerning Toleration, Works of John Locke, vol. 6, 52; Second Letter Concerning Toleration, ibid., 100; Third 
Letter for Toleration, ibid., 229, 231; and Fourth Letter for Toleration, ibid., 561. 
xix “The First Draft of An Essay Concerning Toleration” and An Essay Concerning Toleration in Locke, An 
Essay Concerning Toleration And Other Writings on Law and Politics, 1667–1683, 306. This passage was 
carried over into the final version of the Essay Concerning Toleration; see ibid., 286. 
xx For Locke’s reference to papal infallibility, see Locke, Writings on Religion, 69.  
xxi Ibid., 72. 
xxii Locke, Drafts for the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 71. 
xxiii See Locke, Political Essays, “Philanthropy,” 225 (1675), “Toleration A,” 232 (1675) and “Toleration B,” 
247 (1676). 
xxiv Locke, Writings on Religion, 75. 
xxv Ibid., 76. 
xxvi Ibid. 
xxvii  Benjamin Furly. 
xxviii  Bodleian Library MS Locke f. 9 (1686), pages 27–28. 
xxix Barclay, The Possibility and Necessity of the Inward Immediate Revelation of the Spirit of God, 28. 
xxx Replacing Nuovo’s “Just” with “I use.” 
xxxi Locke, Writings on Religion, 39. 
xxxii Ibid., 40. 
xxxiii Locke to Furly, 9/19 January 1688, Corr., vol. 3, 332–333. 
xxxiv See Locke to Furly, 9/19 January 1688, ibid., 332.  
xxxv For Le Clerc’s claim that he translated the Abrégé, see Le Clerc, “Eloge de feu Mr. Locke,” 376–377. An 
anonymous reader for the journal alerted me to this reference. 
xxxvi  See Hill and Milton, “The Epitome (Abrégé) of Locke’s Essay.” 
xxxvii  King, The Life of John Locke, vol. 2, 291. 
xxxviii  Locke, “Extrait,” 138. The version of the Abrégé that appeared in Dunton’s The Young-Students-Library, 
contains the expression “original and immediate Revelation” (179), reinforcing Hill and Milton’s claim that the 
French text was the source for the Dunton version. See Hill and Milton, “The Epitome (Abrégé) of Locke’s 
Essay,” 5. 
xxxix Essay IV. xviii. 3. 
xl Essay IV. xix. 5. 
xli Specific references to travel literature are given; see Locke, An Early Draft of Locke’s Essay, 119. 
xlii Ibid., 114–116. 
xliii Ibid., 114. 
xliv Ibid., 119. 
xlv Ibid., 119. 
                                                                                                                                                   
xlvi Ibid., 120. 
xlvii Ibid., 124–125. 
xlviii Ibid., 125. Locke owned the second, 1673 edition of Smith’s Select Discourses; LL 2701. 
xlix See Locke to Nicolas Toinard, 5 September 1686, Corr., vol. 3, 30. 
l See, for example, The Conway Letters, letters #254, #255 and #256.  
li Conway Letters, letter #257, 422. 
lii The Conway Letters, letter #261, 427. For Conway’s relations with George Keith, see Hutton, Anne Conway: 
A Woman Philosopher, chapter 9. 
liii On Penn’s friendship with George Keith, see Conway Letters, letter #250. On the vexed issue of Penn’s 
relationship to Locke, see Philip Milton, “John Locke, William Penn and the question of Locke’s pardon.” 
liv LL 2252.  
lv See Anstey, John Locke and Natural Philosophy, 175. 
lvi Keith, Some Reasons and Causes of the Late Separation, 2; LL 1621. 
lvii See Furly to Locke, 7/17 November 1692, Corr., vol. 4, 575–576. 
lviii Corr., vol. 5, 62. For Furly’s report of Keith’s comments on his meeting with Locke whom Keith took to be 
a Cartesian, see ibid., 64. Two salient background points are worth noting in relation to Locke’s meeting with 
Keith. First, van Helmont had been residing at Oates with Locke and the Masham household for at least three 
months prior to Locke’s meeting with Keith. And second, one of the charges leveled against Keith by the 
Quakers was that he subscribed to the doctrine of the transmigration of souls as defended in van Helmont’s Two 
Hundred Queries Moderately propounded Concerning the Doctrine of the Revolution of Humane Souls, 1684; 
LL 2472. 
lix Ibid., 84. 
lx See Furly to Locke, 30 January/9 February 1694, Corr., vol. 5, 2. 
lxi See LL 197, 1614–1624, 2414 and 2421.  
lxii See Keith, A Journal of Travels from New-Hampshire to Caratuck, On the Continent of North America, 22. 
lxiii Another Quaker seceder caught up in the controversy over van Helmont’s Two Hundred Queries, William 
Clarke, wrote to Locke on 1 August 1694, Corr., vol. 5, 97–102. The stimulus for Clarkes’ letter was the attack 
against him in An Answer to Some Queries Propos’d by W. C., or, A Refutation of Helmont’s Pernicious Error, 
1694; LL 2471. 
lxiv See Hendrik Wetstein to Locke, 20/30 June 1688, Corr., vol. 3, 478–479 and LL 201, 202, 202a, 202b and 
202c.  
lxv See Furly, Bibliotheca Furliana sive catalogus librorum Benjamin Furly, 57–59, 92–96, 158–163 for works 
on Quakerism. 
lxvi See Champion, “‘The fodder of our understanding’: Benjamin Furly’s library and intellectual conversation c. 
1680–c. 1725,” 131–146. For additional holdings on Quakerism in Locke’s library, see LL 2412–2421. 
lxvii LL 3078. 
lxviii See Bodleian Library MS Locke f. 10, page 133. The authorship of this work is usually attributed to 
Philippe Naudé. 
lxix Furley to Locke, 12 March 1692, Corr., vol. 4, 414. See also, Furly to Locke, 31 August 1692, ibid., 512. For 
a reference to the Quakers as enthusiasts who may be deceived by the Devil, see Histoire abregée de la 
naissance et du progrez du Kouakerisme, 41–42. 
lxx It is worth noting that Locke wrote to Philipp van Limborch on 6 June 1689, that is, within four months of 
returning to London from the Netherlands, about the status of the Quakers in relation to the Toleration Act that 
had passed into law a few weeks earlier; see Corr., vol. 3, 633. 
lxxi Locke, Writings on Religion, 42 and Lowth, A Vindication of the Divine Authority and Inspiration of the 
Writings of the Old and New Testament, 8–9. 
lxxii Corr., vol. 5, 287. 
lxxiii Ibid., 317. 
lxxiv Ibid., 352. 
lxxv Bodleian Library MS Locke d. 9, pages 306–307. 
lxxvi MS Murray 416, Glasgow University Library. For transcriptions, see Anstey, “Further reflections on 
Locke’s medical remains,” 237–242. 
lxxvii In Docwra, The Second Part of an Apostate-Conscience Exposed, 37–48. 
lxxviii  See Masham (née Cudworth), A Discourse Concerning the Love of God, 6 and 120. 
lxxix The manuscript version of “Of Enthusiasm” is in Bodleian Library MS Locke e. 1, pages 1–7, 9, 10–31. See 
The Digital Locke for dating and transcription: http://www.digitallockeproject.nl/cgi/t/text/text-
idx?c=locke;cc=locke;tpl=texts-metadata.tpl;id=43;idno=DLP-AED (accessed 29 April 2017). 
lxxx Locke, Writings on Religion, 40. 
lxxxi Essay IV. xix. 8 and 6. 
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lxxxii See Essay II. xxxiii. 
lxxxiii Essay IV. xx. 7. 
lxxxiv Essay IV. xviii. 11. For von Leyden’s expansion of Locke’s very similar shorthand journal entry of 15/25 
August 1676, see “Philosophical Shorthand Writings” in Locke, Essays on the Law of Nature, 277. An 
anonymous referee for the journal alerted me to this journal entry. 
lxxxv Jolley, “Reason’s dim candle,” 186. 
lxxxvi See especially Essay IV. xix. 11–15. 
lxxxvii  Essay IV. xix. 15. 
lxxxviii  Locke, Writings on Religion, 40. 
lxxxix Essay IV. xix. 16. 
xc Locke, Writings on Religion, 39. 
xci See also, Locke to W. J., August 1659, Corr., vol. 1, 98. 
xcii For “internal Light”, see Essay IV. xix. 10, 15 bis. For “Light within”, see ibid., 14. 
xciii Locke, Writings on Religion, 39, 40. 
xciv Essay IV. xix. 10, underlining added.  
xcv Coste’s translation appeared as Essai philosophique concernant l’entendement humain, 1700. For Locke’s 
claim that he had read the translation, see “Monsieur Locke au Libraire,” sig. ***1r. 
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